Authors
Gerard O'Brien
University of Adelaide
Jonathan Opie
University of Adelaide
Abstract
We think the best prospect for a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal consciousness is to be found at the confluence of two influential ideas about the mind. The first is the _computational _ _theory of mind_: the theory that treats human cognitive processes as disciplined operations over neurally realised representing vehicles.1 The second is the _representationalist theory of _ _consciousness_: the theory that takes the phenomenal character of conscious experiences (the “what-it-is-likeness”) to be constituted by their representational content.2 Together these two theories suggest that phenomenal consciousness might be explicable in terms of the representational content of the neurally realised representing vehicles that are generated and manipulated in the course of cognition. The simplest and most elegant hypothesis that one might entertain in this regard is that conscious experiences are identical to (i.e., are one and the same as) the brain’s representing vehicles
Keywords Connectionism  Consciousness  Experience  Metaphysics  Mind  Phenomenology
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Representations Gone Mental.Alex Morgan - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):213-244.
Structural Representations and the Brain.Oron Shagrir - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):519-545.
Identifying Phenomenal Consciousness.Elizabeth Schier - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):216-222.
The Epistemology of Geometry I: The Problem of Exactness.Anne Newstead & Franklin James - 2010 - Proceedings of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science 2009.

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