Digital computers versus dynamical systems: A conflation of distinctions

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):648-649 (1998)
Abstract
The distinction at the heart of van Gelder’s target article is one between digital computers and dynamical systems. But this distinction conflates two more fundamental distinctions in cognitive science that should be keep apart. When this conflation is undone, it becomes apparent that the “computational hypothesis” (CH) is not as dominant in contemporary cognitive science as van Gelder contends; nor has the “dynamical hypothesis” (DH) been neglected.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X98451732
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