Abstract

This dissertation consists of two parts. In the first part I discuss the thought of some of Butler's forgotten intellectual predecessors in the Church of England, viz., Robert Sanderson, Jeremy Taylor, and John Tillotson. A number of aspects of their thought shed light on Butler's. ;The second part of my dissertation, the principal part, is an analytical study, focusing on what I take to be Butler's main contribution to ethics, a case for the reasonableness of practicing virtue or morality. My general conclusion is that Butler's case is quite strong, given the teleological and theological assumptions he and his intended audience share, and that it should be of interest to readers who do not share those assumptions--though they may not find it altogether convincing. ;In the course of my discussion I emphasize the extent to which Butler's work in ethics is connected with his religious views and concerns. I also offer interpretations of his notions of human nature, conscience, its authority, and virtue. On Butler's view human nature is our original nature as God created it; conscience is natural conscience ; virtue is obedience to natural conscience; the authority of conscience is its original tendency to govern and direct all the "principles" or motives of action, a tendency arising largely from our natural belief that we ought to obey it. I argue that there is nothing in Butler's understanding of these notions which trivializes his case