Putting content into a vehicle theory of consciousness

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):175-196 (1999)

Authors
Gerard O'Brien
University of Adelaide
Jonathan Opie
University of Adelaide
Abstract
The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consciousness with the brain’s explicit representation of information in the form of stable patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter front their concerns range from the general plausibility of a vehicle theory to our specific attempts to deal with the dissociation studies. We address these concerns, and then finish by considering whether the vehicle theory we have defended has a coherent story to tell about the active, unified subject to whom conscious experiences belong
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Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.1017/s0140525x99531798
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References found in this work BETA

The Visual Brain in Action (Precis).David Milner - 1998 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4.
Meaning and Mental Representation.Peter Carruthers - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (161):527-530.

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Citations of this work BETA

Sidestepping the Semantics of “Consciousness”.Michael V. Antony - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):289-290.
Vehicle, Process, and Hybrid Theories of Consciousness.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):303-305.

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