Self-Knowing Agents

Oxford University Press (2007)
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Abstract

Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action.

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Lucy O'Brien
University College London

Citations of this work

Mental Action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.
Animalism is Either False of Uninteresting (Perhaps Both).Matt Duncan - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):187-200.
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Modeling Practical Thinking.Matthew Mosdell - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (4):445-464.
Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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