Perceptual Capacities, Success, and Content

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):738-743 (2020)
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Abstract

Schellenberg's capacitism maintains that perceptual capacities ground representational content because perceptual capacities can be exercised unsuccessfully. This paper argues against the claim that exercise conditions differ from success conditions such that the relevant perceptual capacities can be exercised unsuccessfully in the way needed to ground representational content.

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10.1111/phpr.12688

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Casey O'Callaghan
Washington University in St. Louis

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