Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):157 – 161 (2007)
A central argument of Alfred Mele's Free Will and Luck (2006) is that the problem of luck poses essentially the same problem for all the main indeterministic accounts of free will. Consequently, there is no advantage is certain theories (notably, agent-causal theories) in their capacity to respond to the problem of luck. I argue that Mele has not made a persuasive case for these claims
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References found in this work BETA
Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.Timothy O'Connor - 2000 - Oxford University Press USA.
Contrastive Explanation and the Demons of Determinism.C. Hitchcock - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):585-612.
Citations of this work BETA
Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
Modest Libertarianism and Practical Reason.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):201-216.
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Alfred Mele's Metaphysical Freedom?E. J. Coffman & Ted A. Warfield - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.
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On Alfred Mele's Free Will and Luck.Derk Pereboom - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172.
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