Philosophical Topics 32 (1):241-256 (2004)

Timothy O'Connor
Indiana University, Bloomington
Many philosophers judge that typical agent-causal accounts of freedom improperly sacrifice the possibility of rational explanation of the action for the sake of securing control, while others judge that the reverse shortcoming plagues typical event causal accounts. (Of course, many philosophers make both these judgments.) After briefly rehearsing the reasons for these verdicts on the two traditional strategies, we undertake an extended examination of Randolph Clarke's recent attempt to meet the challenge by proposing an original, "integrated agent-causal" account of human free action. We argue that Clarke's account fails. In a final section, we sketch a more promising route to integration.
Keywords Agent Causation  Event Causation  Free Will
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Reprint years 2006
ISBN(s) 0276-2080
DOI 10.5840/philtopics2004321/21
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Agent Causation in a Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics.Jonathan D. Jacobs & Timothy O'Connor - 2013 - In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
Agent-Causal Theories.Timothy O'Connor - 2011 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 309-328.

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