Erkenntnis 84 (2):325-341 (2019)

Abstract
Recent work on consciousness has distinguished between the qualitative character of an experience and its subjective character or subjectivity. It is often suggested that subjectivity is a characteristic inner awareness subjects enjoy of their own occurrent experiences. A number of thinkers have also suggested that not only is each subject aware of her own experiences, but that in having these experiences she is aware of them as her own. This is the subjectivity-mineness thesis: necessarily, an experience which is given to its subject is given as the subject’s own experience. I shall argue against the subjectivity-mineness thesis. While I agree that experiences are characterised by inner awareness, it is questionable whether inner awareness entails an awareness of my experiences as mine. I shall offer an alternative account of inner awareness, the impersonal account. On this account the subject of the experience is not presented in the content of inner awareness, but the mode of inner awareness is such that necessarily, this awareness is an awareness of experiences which belong to this subject. This is what makes inner awareness a characteristically first-personal form of awareness.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-017-9960-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,160
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

View all 49 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Selfhood: A Reply to Some Critics.Dan Zahavi - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):703-718.
Kant on Inner Sensations and the Parity Between Inner and Outer Sense.Yibin Liang - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (10):307-338.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Mineness Without Minimal Selves.M. V. P. Slors & F. Jongepier - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):193-219.
Memory and Mineness in Personal Identity.Rebecca Roache - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):479-489.
Heidegger On Mineness And Memory.Stephan Käufer - 2011 - Annales Philosophici 2:51-65.
The Sense of Mineness.M. Guillot & M. Garcia-Carpintero (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
Self and Subjectivity.Kim Atkins (ed.) - 2005 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Toward an Explanatory Framework for Mental Ownership.Timothy Lane - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):251-286.
What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental?William G. Lycan - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:229-238.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-12-19

Total views
57 ( #197,835 of 2,499,424 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #139,273 of 2,499,424 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes