Authors
Cailin O'Connor
University of California, Irvine
James Weatherall
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
Contemporary societies are often “polarized”, in the sense that sub-groups within these societies hold stably opposing beliefs, even when there is a fact of the matter. Extant models of polarization do not capture the idea that some beliefs are true and others false. Here we present a model, based on the network epistemology framework of Bala and Goyal, 784–811 1998), in which polarization emerges even though agents gather evidence about their beliefs, and true belief yields a pay-off advantage. As we discuss, these results are especially relevant to polarization in scientific communities, for these reasons. The key mechanism that generates polarization involves treating evidence generated by other agents as uncertain when their beliefs are relatively different from one’s own.
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Reprint years 2018
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DOI 10.1007/s13194-018-0213-9
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
The Division of Cognitive Labor.Philip Kitcher - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5-22.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge.Helen Longino - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Exploring Scientific Inquiry Via: Agent-Based Modelling.Dunja Šešelja - 2021 - Perspectives on Science 29 (4):537-557.

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