Supervenience, goodness, and higher-order universals

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1):20 – 47 (1991)

Graham Oddie
University of Colorado, Boulder
Supervenience theses promise ontological economy without reducibility. The problem is that they face a dilemma: either the relation of supervenience entails reducibility or it is mysterious. Recently higher-order universals have been invoked to avoid the dilemma. This article develops a higher-order framework in which this claim can be assessed. It is shown that reducibility can be avoided, but only at the cost of a rather radical metaphysical proposal.
Keywords Higher-order Logics  Logic  Supervenience  Universal
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DOI 10.1080/00048409112344501
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References found in this work BETA

What is a Law of Nature?D. M. Armstrong - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
Universals and Scientific Realism.D. M. Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
The Nature of Laws.Michael Tooley - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):667-98.
What is a Law of Nature?Mark Wilson - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):435-441.

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Critical Notice.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):475 – 488.

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