British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):129-135 (1990)
A number of different theories of truthlikeness have been proposed, but most can be classified into one of two different main programmes: the probability-content programme and the likeness programme.1 In Brink and Heidema  we are offered a further proposal, with the attraction of some novelty. I argue that while the heuristic path taken by the authors is rather remote from what they call ‘the well-worn paths’,2 in fact their point of arrival is rather closer to existing proposals within the likeness approach than might at first appear. It is the purpose of this note to outline the logical connections and to assess the reasons which have been offered in favour of the new proposal.
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Similarity Semantics and Minimal Changes of Belief.Sven Ove Hansson - 1992 - Erkenntnis 37 (3):401-429.
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