Can a Justified Belief Be False?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):561 - 568 (1976)
Abstract
Robert richman tries to defend a justified-True-Belief analysis of knowledge by attacking the assumption that a justified belief can be false. But, Although 'p is justified but false' is incoherent if asserted about the way things actually are, It is not incoherent if asserted about a supposed situation. And critics of a justified-True-Belief analysis need only do the latter
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.1976.10716168
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References found in this work BETA
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):246-257.
Paradox Regained: A Reply to Meyers and Stern.J. Gregory Dees & John A. Hart - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (12):367-372.

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