The indexical nature of sensory concepts

Philosophical Papers 32 (2):169-181 (2002)
John O'Dea
University of Tokyo
This paper advances the thesis that sensory concepts have as a semantic component the first person indexical.
Keywords Concept  Indexicality  Metaphysics  Scepticism  Sensation
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DOI 10.1080/05568640209485100
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References found in this work BETA

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Mad Pain and Martian Pain.David Lewis - 1980 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Harvard University Press. pp. 216-222.

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Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Erhan Demircioglu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.
On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness.Bernard Molyneux - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):211 - 228.

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