How Can Theology Be Moral?

Journal of Religious Ethics 17 (2):81 - 94 (1989)

A tension exists between the disciplines of theology, which seeks to discern the rational order of what is believed and to impose intellectual discipline on its presentation, and moral thought, which is practical in nature, thought-towards-action. More fully expressed, this tension is found in three antinomies: that theology is declarative, while moral thought is deliberative: that theology is evangelical, while moral thought is problematic; and that while theology is Christocentric, moral thought must be generic. This essay argues that despite the tension inherent in its dual focus, moral theology can be an authentic enterprise, proceeding via a dialectic within these three antinomies.
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