Heritability and Genetic Causation

Philosophy of Science 72 (5):699-709 (2005)
Abstract
The method in human genetics of ascribing causal responsibility to genotype by the use of heritability estimates has been heavily criticized over the years. It has been argued that these estimates are rarely valid and do not serve the purpose of tracing genetic causes. Recent contributions strike back at this criticism. I present and discuss two opposing views on these matters represented by Richard Lewontin and Neven Sesardic, and I suggest that some of the disagreement is based on differing concepts of genetic causation. I use the distinction of structuring and triggering causes to help clarifying the basis for the opposing views.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/508126
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,769
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

77 ( #67,177 of 2,158,886 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #132,568 of 2,158,886 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums