Moral Exemplars in the Analects: The Good Person is That

New York: Routledge (2011)
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Abstract

In this study, Olberding proposes a new theoretical model for reading the _Analects_. Her thesis is that the moral sensibility of the text derives from an effort to conceptually capture and articulate the features seen in exemplars, exemplars that are identified and admired pre-theoretically and thus prior to any conceptual criteria for virtue. Put simply, Olberding proposes an "origins myth" in which Confucius, already and prior to his philosophizing knows _whom _he judges to be virtuous. The work we see him and the _Analects'_ authors pursuing is their effort to explain in an organized, generalized, and abstract way _why _pre-theoretically identified exemplars are virtuous. Moral reasoning here begins with people and with inchoate experiences of admiration for them. The conceptual work of the text reflects the attempt to analyze such people and parse such experiences in order to distill abstract qualities that account for virtue and can guide emulation

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Amy Olberding
University of Oklahoma

Citations of this work

Negative Epistemic Exemplars.Mark Alfano & Emily Sullivan - 2019 - In Benjamin R. Sherman & Stacey Goguen, Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social and Psychological Perspectives. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.
Chinese ethics.David Wong - 2012 - In Ed Zalta, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Suffering and Transformative Experience.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2019 - In Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns, Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value, and Normativity. London: Routledge. pp. 165-179.
Confucianism, Curiosity, and Moral Self-Cultivation.Ian James Kidd - 2018 - In Ilhan Inan, Lani Watson, Dennis Whitcomb & Safiye Yigit, The Moral Psychology of Curiosity. Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 97-116.

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