Abstract
Is consistency always epistemically virtuous? In this paper, I examine one threat to the traditional view that consistency is a minimum requirement for rational belief. Central to the argument is the notion of epistemic probability, understood as the degree of support or confirmation provided by the total available evidence. My strategy in examining this argument is to apply analogous reasoning to carefully tailored examples. The conclusions which emerge are substantive, informative and utterly implausible. I conclude, first, that the argument for inconsistency fails and, second, that it fails because epistemic probability does not conform to the axioms of the probability calculus. A plausible alternate model for determining degree of support is briefly considered.
Keywords Conference Proceedings  Contemporary Philosophy
Categories No categories specified
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ISBN(s) 9781634350518
DOI 10.5840/wcp20-paideia199845886
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