Philosophical Studies 174 (2):485-506 (2017)

Authors
Luis R. G. Oliveira
University of Houston
Abstract
Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us.
Keywords Epistemology  Evidentialism  Wide-Scope Requirements  Normative Authority
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0693-4
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References found in this work BETA

The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
The Domain of Reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deontological Evidentialism and Ought Implies Can.Luis Oliveira - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2567-2582.
On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.
Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification.Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton M. Littlejohn (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy Evidence. Routledge.
Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth.Timothy Perrine - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):515-529.
Clifford, William Kingdom.Luis R. G. Oliveira - forthcoming - In Stewart Goetz & Charles Taliaferro (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion. Wiley-Blackwell.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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