Deontological evidentialism, wide-scope, and privileged values

Philosophical Studies 174 (2):485-506 (2017)

Abstract

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us.

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Author's Profile

Luis R. G. Oliveira
University of Houston

References found in this work

The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Moral Realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.

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Citations of this work

Clifford, William Kingdon.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2021 - In Stewart Goetz & Charles Taliaferro (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion. Wiley-Blackwell.
On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.
Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification.Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton M. Littlejohn (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy Evidence. Routledge.
Deontological Evidentialism and Ought Implies Can.Luis Oliveira - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2567-2582.

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