Authors
Alberto Oliva
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
Abstract
Starting from the epistemic requirements stated by the standard view of knowledge, according to which knowledge is ‘justified true belief’, this article aims to identify the reasons why substantive philosophical theories have failed to satisfy them. Accepted this view of knowledge, philosophy will hardly be able to assign cognitive status to its theories. This article also intends to show that philosophy has its cognitive credibility put in check when it constructs abstruse rhetorical exercises that speciously seek to legitimize themselves as knowledge. Besides forging philosophical theories deprived of cognitive value, philosophy creates theories composed by propositions clearly meaningless. In developing theories devoid of any cognitive potential and theories whose propositions lack meaning, philosophy is liable to have its cognitivity seriously questioned. However, the final assessment of philosophy cannot be confined to its cognitive dimension since its theories have the power of providing ways of seeing reality even when they fail in their attempts to explain objects
Keywords verdade  justificação epistêmica  metafilosofia  Metaphilosophy. Truth. Epistemic justification. Cognitive meaning.  significado cognitivo
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DOI 10.15448/1984-6746.2014.1.13539
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References found in this work BETA

Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
The Fixation of Belief.C. S. Peirce - 1877 - Popular Science Monthly 12 (1):1--15.
Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):89-123.

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