Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2069-2086 (2016)

Authors
Luis R. G. Oliveira
University of Houston
Abstract
This paper defends a novel account of how to determine the intrinsic value of possible worlds. Section 1 argues that a highly intuitive and widely accepted account leads to undesirable consequences. Section 2 takes the first of two steps towards a novel account by clarifying and defending a view about value-contribution that is based on some of W. D. Ross’ claims about the value of pleasure. Section 3 takes the second step by clarifying and defending a view about value-suppression that is based on Ross’ claims about the interplay between prima-facie duties. Section 4 states and defends the account that I call Rossian Totalism. According to this account, the atoms of intrinsic value within a world only sometimes contribute their intrinsic value to the value of that world.
Keywords Metaethics  Axiology  Intrinsic Value  Repugnant Conclusion  W.D. Ross
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0597-8
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Utilitarianism.J. S. Mill - 1861 - Oxford University Press UK.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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