Philosophical Studies 115 (1):33-53 (2003)
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Abstract |
In Why pains are not mental objects Guy Douglasrightly argues that pains are modes rather than objects ofperceptions or sensations. In this paper I try to go a stepfurther and argue that there are circumstances when pains canbecome objects even while they remain modes of experience.By analysing cases of extreme pain as presented by Scarry,Sartre, Wiesel, Grahek and Wall, I attempt to show thatintense physical pain may evolve into a force that, likeimagination, can make our most intense state of experiencebecome a mental object. I shall finally argue that, thoughextreme pains cannot serve as paradigm cases, they do showthe general importance of taking pain states to be objects
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Keywords | Experience Mental Object Metaphysics Pain Douglas, G |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2004 |
DOI | 10.1023/A:1024919818322 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World.Elaine Scarry - 1985 - Oxford University Press.
The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World.Elaine Scarry - 1985 - Oxford University Press USA.
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