In Stephan Blatti Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), Essays on Animalism. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Authors
Eric T. Olson
University of Sheffield
Abstract
Animalism is the view that you and I are animals. That is, we are animals in the straightforward sense of having the property of being an animal, or in that each of us is identical to an animal-not merely in the derivative sense of having animal bodies, or of being "constituted by" animals. And by 'animal' I mean an organism of the animal kingdom." Sensible though it may appear, animalism is highly contentious. The most common objection is that it conflicts with widespread and deep beliefs about our identity over time. These beliefs are brought out in reactions to fictional cases. Suppose, for instance, that your brain is transplanted into my head. The being who ends up with that organ, everyone assumes, will remember your life and not mine. More generally, he will have your beliefs, preferences, plans, and other mental properties, for the most part at least. Who would he be-you, me, or someone else?
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References found in this work BETA

Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
What Are We?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.
Person and Object.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1978 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (2):281-283.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Generic Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (8):405-429.
The Nature of People.Eric T. Olson - 2014 - In S. Luper (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death. Cambridge University Press. pp. 30-46.
On Parfit's View That We Are Not Human Beings.Eric T. Olson - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:39-56.
Resisting the Remnant-Person Problem.Eric Yang - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (3):389-404.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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