Mind 129 (515):715-735 (2020)

Authors
Eric T. Olson
University of Sheffield
Abstract
It is widely held that every person is a person essentially, where being a person is having special mental properties such as intelligence and self-consciousness. It follows that nothing can acquire or lose these properties. The paper argues that this rules out all familiar psychological-continuity views of personal identity over time. It also faces grave difficulties in accounting for the mental powers of human beings who are not intelligent and self-conscious, such as foetuses and those with dementia.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzaa016
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References found in this work BETA

Survival and Identity.David K. Lewis - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
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Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Philosophy 58 (223):118-121.

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