Studia Logica 73 (2):219 - 240 (2003)
Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not forthcoming.
|Keywords||Philosophy Logic Mathematical Logic and Foundations Computational Linguistics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.
AGM 25 Years.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295-331.
Similar books and articles
Kant on the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason.Pauline Kleingeld - 1998 - Review of Metaphysics 52 (2):500-528.
A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):104-134.
Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision.Hans Rott - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200.
Choosing Your Beliefs.Gabriella Pigozzi, G. Boella, C. Costa Pereirdaa, A. Tettamanzi & and Leon van der Torre - manuscript
Rational Choice and Agm Belief Revision.Giacomo Bonanno - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence 173:1194-1203.
Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning.Hans Rott - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads18 ( #267,976 of 2,158,805 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #64,757 of 2,158,805 )
How can I increase my downloads?