Dispositions and reductionism in psychology

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 5 (October):129-44 (1975)
1) reductionism in psychology is not a single move regarding a single conceptual issue, but is rather a complex of concerns with a network of conceptually interrelated issues. 2) reductionistic moves tend to explicitly rely upon or implicitly presuppose the use of dispositional terms. 3) dispositional terms will not serve to effect reductionistic programs because they themselves require many of the features that those programs require excising. 4) if dispositionals are not themselves logically tied to intentionals, they at least bear a sufficient family resemblance to participate in logical problems similar to those of intentionals and modals. 5) if dispositionals and intentionals do not require the teleological frame from which they historically arose, then they at least require some alternative accounting, not an elimination
Keywords Disposition  Intention  Psychology  Reductionism  Science  Social Sciences  Carnap  Hempel  Ryle, G
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-5914.1975.tb00348.x
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