Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (2):143-163 (1998)
The notion of epistemic coherence is interpreted as involving not only consistency but also stability. The problem how to consolidate a belief system, i.e., revise it so that it becomes coherent, is studied axiomatically as well as in terms of set-theoretical constructions. Representation theorems are given for subtractive consolidation (where coherence is obtained by deleting beliefs) and additive consolidation (where coherence is obtained by adding beliefs).
|Keywords||Belief revision consolidation coherence stability|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Coherence in Epistemology and Belief Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):93-108.
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Repertoire Contraction.Sven Ove Hansson - 2013 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 22 (1):1-21.
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