Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence

Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):397-402 (2016)
Jonas Olson
Stockholm University
_ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 4, pp 397 - 402 Moral error theorists and moral realists agree about several disputed metaethical issues. They typically agree that ordinary moral judgments are beliefs and that ordinary moral utterances purport to refer to moral facts. But they disagree on the crucial ontological question of whether there are any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary moral beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral judgments uniformly untrue. Perhaps because of its kinship with moral realism, moral error theory is often considered the most notorious of moral scepticisms. While the view has been widely discussed, it has had relatively few defenders. _Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence_ examines the view from a historical as well as a contemporary perspective, and purports to respond to some of its most prominent challenges. This précis is a brief summary of the book’s content.
Keywords Hume   moral error theory   queerness   Mackie   irreducible normativity
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DOI 10.1163/17455243-01304001
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A Refutation of Morals.John Mackie - 1946 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1-2):77 – 90.
A Refutation of Morals.John Mackie - 1946 - Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 24 (1-2):77-90.

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