Subjective Rightness and Minimizing Expected Objective Wrongness

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):417-441 (2017)
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Abstract

It has become increasingly common for philosophers to distinguish between objective and subjective rightness, and there has been much discussion recently about what an adequate theory of subjective rightness looks like. In this article, I propose a new theory of subjective rightness. According to it, an action is subjectively right if and only if it minimizes expected objective wrongness. I explain this theory in detail and argue that it avoids many of the problems that other theories of subjective rightness face. I end by responding to some objections.

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Citations of this work

More Seriously Wrong, More Importantly Right.Thomas Hurka - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (1):41-58.
The ranges of reasons and creasons.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-10.
Duty and Doubt.Seth Lazar - 2020 - Journal of Practical Ethics 8 (1):28-55.

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References found in this work

Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186.
Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
The Right and the Good.Some Problems in Ethics.W. D. Ross & H. W. B. Joseph - 1933 - Journal of Philosophy 30 (19):517-527.

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