Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):89-101 (2021)

Eric T. Olson
University of Sheffield
Substance dualism says that all thinking beings are immaterial. This sits awkwardly with the fact that thinking requires an intact brain. Many dualists say that bodily activity is causally necessary for thinking. But if a material thing can cause thinking, why can’t it think? No argument for dualism, however convincing, answers this question, leaving dualists with more to explain than their opponents.
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DOI 10.18290/rf21691-9
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Personal Identity.R. G. Swinburne - 1974 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:231 - 247.
A Compound of Two Substances.Eric T. Olson - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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