The Ontological Basis of Strong Artificial Life

Artificial Life 3:29-39 (1997)
Abstract
This article concerns the claim that it is possible to create living organisms, not merely models that represent organisms, simply by programming computers. I ask what sort of things these computer-generated organisms are supposed to be. I consider four possible answers to this question: The organisms are abstract complexes of pure information; they are material objects made of bits of computer hardware; they are physical processes going on inside the computer; and they are denizens of an entire artificial world, different from our own, that the programmer creates. I argue that could not be right, that collapses into, and that would make strong alife either absurd or uninteresting. Thus, "virtual" strong alife amounts to the claim that, by programming a computer, one can literally bring bits of its hardware to life
Keywords life  artificial life  ontology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,169
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Three Paradigms of Computer Science.Amnon H. Eden - 2007 - Minds and Machines 17 (2):135-167.
Problems for a Philosophy of Software Engineering.Stefan Gruner - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (2):275-299.
Ethics and Artificial Life: From Modeling to Moral Agents. [REVIEW]John P. Sullins - 2005 - Ethics and Information Technology 7 (3):139-148.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Contemporary Significance of Confucianism.Tang Yijie & Yan Xin - 2008 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (4):477-501.
Shifting Frames: From Divided to Distributed Psychologies of Scientific Agents.Peter J. Taylor - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:304-310.
The Hiddenness Argument Revisited.J. L. Schellenberg - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (3):287-303.
How Bad Is Rape?H. E. Baber - 1987 - Hypatia 2 (2):125-138.
Added to PP index
2010-07-27

Total downloads
32 ( #164,754 of 2,192,003 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #289,020 of 2,192,003 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature