Abstract
In this dissertation, I develop and defend some of W. D. Ross’s moral views. Ross’s views, I argue, are often highly plausible, though it is also often the case that variations on his views are needed in order to remain philosophically tenable. In my dissertation, I explain why these variations are necessary and what they should look like. In chapter 1, I discuss Ross’s theory of moral rightness in his most important work, The Right and the Good. In chapters 2 and 3, I correct various misunderstandings about Ross’s position: I argue that he is no more a particularist about absolute duty than a utilitarian or a Kantian is, and on many definitions of “pluralism” present in the literature, he is not in fact a pluralist, as he is typically assumed to be. In chapter 4, I discuss several objections that Ross later comes to make to his own theory of rightness; I argue, however, that none of them are any good. In chapter 5, I argue against Ned Markosian’s recent claim that “Rossian Minimalism” is the best theory of rightness that makes use of the concept of a prima facie duty: Ross’s own theory is, I maintain, superior to Rossian Minimalism. In chapter 6, I address some objections to Ross’s theory suggested by Michael Stocker and Michael Slote and demonstrate that the best way of responding to them is by transforming Ross’s theory into a “dual-ranking” one. In chapter 7, I discuss Ross’s theory of the subjective sense of “right”. I show that Ross’s theory is problematic, and I offer a better theory in its place. In chapter 8, I turn to Ross’s theory of moral goodness. I argue that his theory is more plausible than other theories suggested in the literature, but it suffers from the “nepotism problem.” I show that Ross’s solution to this problem is unsatisfactory and suggest a better way forward.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,159
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

A Defense of a Particularist Research Program.Uri D. Leibowitz - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2):181-199.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Doubts About Prima Facie Duties.Peter Jones - 1970 - Philosophy 45 (171):39 - 54.
Sir David Ross's Pluralistic Theory of Duty.Kenneth Wilson Cooley - 1992 - Dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
A Kantian Intuitionism.Robert Audi - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):601-635.
On Being Deserving.James Owen McLeod - 1995 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Ross and the Concept of a Prima Facie Duty.H. J. McCloskey - 1963 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):336 – 345.
A Partial Application Procedure for Ross’s Ethical Theory.B. C. Postow - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Research 31:239-248.
Prima Facie Good.R. Kane - 1988 - Journal of Value Inquiry 22 (4):279-297.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-11-11

Total views
19 ( #564,498 of 2,454,835 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,241 of 2,454,835 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes