What does functionalism tell us about personal identity?

Noûs 36 (4):682-698 (2002)
Sydney Shoemaker argues that the functionalist theory of mind entails a psychological-continuity view of personal identity, as well as providing a defense of that view against a crucial objection. I show that his view has surprising consequences, e.g. that no organism could have mental properties and that a thing's mental properties fail to supervene even weakly on its microstructure and surroundings. I then argue that the view founders on "fission" cases and rules out our being material things. Functionalism tells us little if anything about personal identity
Keywords Continuity  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Personal Identity  Psychology  Shoemaker, S
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1468-0068.00407
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 25,683
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Persons, Animals, and Identity.Sydney Shoemaker - 2008 - Synthese 162 (3):313 - 324.
Bodily Thought and the Corpse Problem.Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):575-592.
Functionalism and Thinking Animals.Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):347 - 354.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Personal Identity.R. G. Swinburne - 1973 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:231 - 247.
Functionalism, the Brain, and Personal Identity.Lawrence H. Davis - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):259-79.
Functionalism and Thinking Animals.Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):347 - 354.
Functionalism and Personal Identity.Lawrence H. Davis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):781-804.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

263 ( #11,488 of 2,143,797 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #91,504 of 2,143,797 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums