A Remark on Probabilistic Measures of Coherence

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 61 (1):129-140 (2020)
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In recent years, some authors have proposed quantitative measures of the coherence of sets of propositions. Such probabilistic measures of coherence (PMCs) are, in general terms, functions that take as their argument a set of propositions (along with some probability distribution) and yield as their value a number that is supposed to represent the degree of coherence of the set. In this paper, I introduce a minimal constraint on PMC theories, the weak stability principle, and show that any correct, coherent, and complete PMC cannot satisfy it. As a matter of fact, the argument offered in this paper can be applied to any coherence theory that uses a priori procedures. I briefly explore some consequences of this fact.

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Sergi Oms
Universitat de Barcelona

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Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Is coherence truth conducive?T. Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338-345.
What is the problem of coherence and truth?Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):246-272.

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