The Paradox of Moralistic Fallacy: A Case against the Dangerous Knowledge

Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 40 (2):157-190 (2018)
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Abstract

In this article, the concept of moralistic fallacy introduced by B. D. Davis is elaborated on in more detail. The main features of this fallacy are discussed, and its general form is presented. The moralistic fallacy might have some undesirable outcomes. Some of them might even be in direct conflict to the original moral position. If this occurs, it is possible to characterize it as a paradox of moralistic fallacy. The possibility of this paradox provides a further reason not to prevent any scientific inquiries and not to depict any knowledge as dangerous.

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reprint Ondráček, Tomáš (2019) "The Paradox of Moralistic Fallacy: A Case against the Dangerous Knowledge". Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 40(2):191-210

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Tomáš Ondráček
Masaryk University

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