Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):393-405 (2007)

Authors
Onora O'Neill
Cambridge University
Abstract
Norms are apt for reasoning because they have propositional structure and content; they are practical because they aim to guide action, rather than to describe aspects of the world. These two features hold equally of norms construed sociologically as the norms of specific social groups, and of norms conceived abstractly as principles of action. On either view, norms are indeterminate while acts are particular and determinate. Consequently norms cannot fully specify which particular act is to be done. Are they then not genuinely action-guiding unless supplemented by practical judgment? Yet accounts of practical judgement are often thin, sometimes seeing it as blind, unreasoned `picking' of one rather than another enactment of a norm. However, on another view practical judgement carries the substantive task of seeking ways of acting that satisfy a plurality of norms, which can be both reasoned and practical. Key Words: direction of fit • judgement • moral conflict • norms • practical principles • remainders.
Keywords Direction of Fit   Judgement   Moral Conflict   Norms   Remainders   Practical Principles
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DOI 10.1177/1740468107083251
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References found in this work BETA

Persons, Character, and Morality.Bernard Williams - 1976 - In James Rachels (ed.), Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press.
Moral Dilemmas and Consistency.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):121-136.
Practical Reason and its Animal Precursors.Sabina Lovibond - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):262–273.
Practical Reason and its Animal Precursors.Sabina Lovibond - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):262-273.

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Citations of this work BETA

Political Legitimacy as a Problem of Judgment.Thomas Fossen - 2022 - Social Theory and Practice 48 (1):89-113.
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Applying Principles to Cases and the Problem of Judgment.John K. Davis - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):563 - 577.

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