Normativity and practical judgement

Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):393-405 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Norms are apt for reasoning because they have propositional structure and content; they are practical because they aim to guide action, rather than to describe aspects of the world. These two features hold equally of norms construed sociologically as the norms of specific social groups, and of norms conceived abstractly as principles of action. On either view, norms are indeterminate while acts are particular and determinate. Consequently norms cannot fully specify which particular act is to be done. Are they then not genuinely action-guiding unless supplemented by practical judgment? Yet accounts of practical judgement are often thin, sometimes seeing it as blind, unreasoned `picking' of one rather than another enactment of a norm. However, on another view practical judgement carries the substantive task of seeking ways of acting that satisfy a plurality of norms, which can be both reasoned and practical. Key Words: direction of fit • judgement • moral conflict • norms • practical principles • remainders.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,592

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Freedom and practical judgement.David Owens - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. pp. 122-137.
Experts, practitioners, and practical judgement.Onora O'Neill - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (2):154-166.
Normativity and Judgement.Julia Tanney - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):17 - 61.
Intention rationality.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241.
Practical reason.R. Jay Wallace - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.


Added to PP

248 (#65,943)

6 months
7 (#142,066)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Onora O'Neill
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

Political Legitimacy as a Problem of Judgment.Thomas Fossen - 2022 - Social Theory and Practice 48 (1):89-113.
The Claimability Condition: Rights as Action‐Guiding Standards.Cristián Rettig - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (2):322-340.
Towards an action-guiding theory of human rights.Cristián Rettig - 2023 - Journal of Global Ethics 19 (2):206-220.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Persons, Character, and Morality.Bernard Williams - 1976 - In James Rachels (ed.), Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press.
Moral dilemmas and consistency.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):121-136.
Practical reason and its animal precursors.Sabina Lovibond - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):262–273.
Practical Reason and its Animal Precursors.Sabina Lovibond - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):262-273.

Add more references