British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (1):121-125 (1989)
In this paper I distinguish two problems of induction: a problem of the uniformity of nature and a problem of the variety of nature. I argue that the traditional problem of induction that Popper poses—the problem of uniformity—is not that which is relevant to science. The problem relevant to science is that of the variety of nature. *I would like to thank Bob Hale, Russell Keat and the Journal's referee for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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