Mental Files and Rational Inferences

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):378-392 (2015)
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My goal in this paper is to discuss the 'Fregean' account of inferences proposed by Recanati in his 'Mental Files' (Oxford University Press, 2012). I raise the following dilemma for the mental files theory. (a) If the premises of certain inferences involve 'the same file' in a strict sense of the expression, then files cannot play the role of modes of presentation. (b) If, on the other hand, the files involved in the premises are 'the same' only in a loose sense, then the notion of file sameness plays no role in accounting for rational inferences, contra Recanati's Fregean account.



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Andrea Onofri
Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí

Citations of this work

Mental filing.Rachel Goodman & Aidan Gray - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):204-226.
The Metaphysics of Mental Files.Simon Prosser - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):657-676.
Replies.François Recanati - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):408-437.
A Review of Recanati’s Mental Files. [REVIEW]Hsiang-Yun Chen - 2020 - NCCU Philosophical Journal 44:177-204.

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References found in this work

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Is sense transparent?John Campbell - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:273-292.
Mental Files: Replies to my Critics.François Recanati - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (36):207-242.

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