Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148 (1999)

Authors
Gerard O'Brien
University of Adelaide
Jonathan Opie
University of Adelaide
Abstract
When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches _vehicle_ and _process_ theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are _dissociable_, and on the other, by the _classical_ computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of _connectionism; _and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: _phenomenal experience consists in the explicit_ _representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks_..
Keywords classicism   computation   connectionism   consciousness   dissociation   mental representation   phenomenal experience
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.1017/s0140525x9900179x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,694
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

View all 131 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
A Theory of Implicit and Explicit Knowledge.Zoltan Dienes & Josef Perner - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):735-808.

View all 42 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Connectionist Vehicles, Structural Resemblance, and the Phenomenal Mind.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 2001 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1-2):13-38.
Putting Content Into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):175-196.
The Disunity of Consciousness.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):378-95.
A Defense of Cartesian Materialism.Jonathan Opie - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):939 - 963.
Neural Activation, Information, and Phenomenal Consciousness.Max Velmans - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):172-173.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
284 ( #31,383 of 2,438,568 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #283,612 of 2,438,568 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes