Psycoloquy 9 (30) (1998)
Green offers us two options: either connectionist models are literal models of brain activity or they are mere instruments, with little or no ontological significance. According to Green, only the first option renders connectionist models genuinely explanatory. I think there is a third possibility. Connectionist models are not literal models of brain activity, but neither are they mere instruments. They are abstract, IDEALISED models of the brain that are capable of providing genuine explanations of cognitive phenomena
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
What Kind of Explanation, If Any, is a Connectionist Net?Christopher D. Green & John Vervaeke - unknown
Classical and Connectionist Models: Levels of Description.Josep E. Corbí - 1993 - Synthese 95 (2):141 - 168.
Mother Nature Versus the Walking Encyclopedia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 21--30.
Scientific Models, Connectionist Networks, and Cognitive Science.Christopher D. Green - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations.
Conceptions and Misconceptions of Connectionism.Ron Sun - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (5):621-621.
Connectionist Modelling in Psychology: A Localist Manifesto.Mike Page - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):443-467.
Re-Assembling the Brain: Are Cell Assemblies the Brain's Language for Recovery of Function?Chris Code - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (2):284-284.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads25 ( #205,543 of 2,178,255 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #316,623 of 2,178,255 )
How can I increase my downloads?