How do connectionist networks compute?

Cognitive Processing 7 (1):30-41 (2006)

Authors
Gerard O'Brien
University of Adelaide
Jonathan Opie
University of Adelaide
Abstract
Although connectionism is advocated by its proponents as an alternative to the classical computational theory of mind, doubts persist about its _computational_ credentials. Our aim is to dispel these doubts by explaining how connectionist networks compute. We first develop a generic account of computation—no easy task, because computation, like almost every other foundational concept in cognitive science, has resisted canonical definition. We opt for a characterisation that does justice to the explanatory role of computation in cognitive science. Next we examine what might be regarded as the “conventional” account of connectionist computation. We show why this account is inadequate and hence fosters the suspicion that connectionist networks aren’t genuinely computational. Lastly, we turn to the principal task of the paper: the development of a more robust portrait of connectionist computation. The basis of this portrait is an explanation of the representational capacities of connection weights, supported by an analysis of the weight configurations of a series of simulated neural networks
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 43,780
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Structural Representations and the Brain.Oron Shagrir - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):519-545.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
78 ( #104,682 of 2,265,030 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #290,849 of 2,265,030 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature