Minimalism, fiction and ethical truth

Abstract

Consider truth predicates. Minimalist analyses of truth predicates may involve commitment to some of the following claims: (i) truth “predicates” are not genuine predicates -- either because the truth “predicate” disappears under paraphrase or translation into deep structure, or because the truth “predicate” is shown to have a non-predicative function by performative or expressivist analysis, or because truth “predicates” must be traded in for predicates of the form “true-in-L”; (ii) truth predicates express ineligible, non-natural, gerrymandered properties; (iii) truth predicates express metaphysically lightweight properties; (iv) truth predicates have thin conceptual roles; (v) truth predicates express properties with no hidden essence; (vi) truth predicates express properties which have no causal or explanatory role in canonical formulations of fundamental theories.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

On the Ramification of Inexactness.La Verne Shelton - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:347-367.
The status of content.Paul A. Boghossian - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84.
A metalogical theory of natural language semantics.Michael Mccord & Arendse Bernth - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (1):73 - 116.
Indexical Predicates.Daniel Rothschild & Gabriel Segal - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (4):467-493.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
302 (#69,462)

6 months
70 (#72,272)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Graham Oppy
Monash University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

General semantics.David K. Lewis - 1970 - Synthese 22 (1-2):18--67.
The status of content.Paul A. Boghossian - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84.
How to stand up for non-cognitivists.Huw Price - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):275-292.
Reference explained away.Robert Brandom - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (9):469-492.

View all 9 references / Add more references