Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:125-128 (1980)
Carrier in a recent paper urges for consideration an argument for skepticism which is based on premises one of which in turn is to be defended by yet another principle (the "Janus Principle" of the text). We feel that the latter principle and the way Carrier wants to use it to defend his skeptical argument will find adherents, but we show that this argument rests on an interesting equivocation quite beyond repair even if we accept the "Janus Principle".
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Epistemological Skepticism(s) and Rational Self-Control.Brian Ribeiro - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):468-477.
Virtue-Theoretic Responses to Skepticism.Guy Axtell - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
Skepticism, Sensitivity, and Closure, or Why the Closure Principle is Irrelevant to External World Skepticism.Adam Leite - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):335-350.
Added to index2010-08-22
Total downloads12 ( #380,702 of 2,177,988 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #317,698 of 2,177,988 )
How can I increase my downloads?