Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge

Abstract
The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. One purpose of this paper is to argue that the notion is not fruitfully explicated in terms of the imagination. The most natural way of presenting a notion of conceivability qua imaginability is open to cogent criticism. In order to avoid such criticism, an advocate of the modal insightfulness of the imagination must broaden the idea of what it is to be imaginable. I argue that this required broadening renders the imagination idle . Consequently, I distinguish two different accounts of the evidential basis of modal knowledge and present a more general argument that concludes that the very notion of conceivability should be eschewed in modal epistemology
Keywords modal epistemology  conceivability  imagination
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00022.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,188
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Conceivability and Possibility.Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
On the Possibility of Skeptical Scenarios.Peter Kung - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):387-407.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

178 ( #24,468 of 2,154,063 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #67,931 of 2,154,063 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums