Fiction, prepositional attitudes, and some truths about falsehood

Dialectica 57 (2):177–190 (2003)
This paper presents an anti‐realist account of fictional objects. Arguing for the involvement of non‐veridical prepositional attitude ascriptions in the understanding of fiction, I maintain that there is no need to invoke Meinongian objects, possibilia or abstract objects for this purpose. In addition I argue against object dependent views . I make a case for empty names playing a more significant role than that accorded on direct reference accounts of names. I close by noting points of similarity and of difference with Amie Thomasson and with Kendall Walton
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2003.tb00264.x
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