Sensory consciousness explained in terms of 'corporality' and 'alerting capacity'

Abstract
How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do not. We are additionally able to explain why different sensory feels differ in the way they do
Keywords qualia  consciousness  sensorimotor  skill  sensation  action
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.1007/s11097-005-9000-0
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,215
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
Neural Plasticity and Consciousness.Susan L. Hurley & Alva Noë - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):131-168.
Color Realism: Toward a Solution to the "Hard Problem".Nigel J. T. Thomas - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):140-145.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Knowing What? Radical Versus Conservative Enactivism.Daniel D. Hutto - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):389-405.
Representation-Hunger Reconsidered.Jan Degenaar & Erik Myin - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3639-3648.
Narrative, Meaning, Interpretation: An Enactivist Approach. [REVIEW]Marco Caracciolo - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):367-384.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
Sensory States, Consciousness, and the Cartesian Assumption.Gregg Caruso - 2005 - In Nathan Smith and Jason Taylor (ed.), Descartes and Cartesianism. Cambridge Scholars Press.
Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.
Control Consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):643-657.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

86 ( #60,169 of 2,164,580 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #347,948 of 2,164,580 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums