Dynamic events and presentism

Philosophical Studies 160 (3):407-414 (2012)
Dynamic events such as a rolling ball moving from one place to another involve change and time intervals and thus presumably successions of static events occurring one after the other, e.g., the ball’s being at a certain place and then at another place during the interval in question. When dynamic events are experienced they should count as present and thus as existent from a presentist point of view. But this seems to imply the existence of the static events involved in them. This in turn seems to imply that there exist past and perhaps even future static events. Therefore, there is a problem for presentism. A possible way out for the presentist is proposed, based on allowing for time-indexed past-oriented and future-oriented properties. One may raise objections regarding the ontological status of these properties and the commitment to past and future objects and times that they seem to bring with them, but these objections can be put to rest.
Keywords Time  Presentism  Events  States  Properties
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9726-1
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Francesco Orilia (2016). Moderate Presentism. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):589-607.

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