Authors
Nico Orlandi
University of California, Santa Cruz
Abstract
Ambiguous figures pose a problem for representationalists, particularly for representationalists who believe that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (MacPherson in Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006). This is because, in viewing ambiguous figures, subjects have perceptual experiences that differ in phenomenal properties without differing in non-conceptual content. In this paper, I argue that ambiguous figures pose no problem for non-conceptual representationalists. I argue that aspect shifts do not presuppose or require the possession of sophisticated conceptual resources and that, although viewing ambiguous figures often causes a change in phenomenal properties, this change is accompanied by a change in non-conceptual content. I illustrate the case by considering specific examples
Keywords Representationalism  Non-conceptual content  Duck–rabbit  Mach’s square/diamond  Phenomenal properties
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9207-1
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References found in this work BETA

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

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Aesthetic Opacity.Emanuele Arielli - 2017 - Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics.

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