Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):163-164 (1999)
O'Brien & Opie's admirably sharp hypothesis gains some of its force by ignoring distinctions in murky areas. I attempt to agitate the waters by suggesting that process and vehicle theories are not so different, that classicism can support a vehicle theory, and that several of the key concepts underlying their theory are less clear than depicted. The connection to information I find especially tenuous. Finally, I address the implications of their theory for unconscious thought.
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