The Guise of the Good

Philosophy Compass 10 (10):714-724 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX


According to the doctrine of the guise of the good, all that is desired is seen by the subject as good to some extent. As a claim about action, the idea is that intentional action, or acting for a reason, is action that is seen as good by the agent. I explore the thesis' main attractions: it provides an account of intentional behavior as something that makes sense to the agent, it paves the way for various views in meta-ethics and normative ethics, and it offers a unified account of practical and theoretical reason. In response to common objections, I examine points of current debate: what is it for something to appear as good? Is value or normative reasons the basic concept at work? How to explain akrasia, perversity in action, and expressive action? I conclude with an overview of alternatives to the guise of the good.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,480

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Guise of the Good and the Problem of Over-Intellectualism.Amir Saemi - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (3):489-501.
Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good.Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Aiming at the Good.Amir Saemi - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):197-219.
Explaining Action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.
The Guise of the Good.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):3 - 26.
The Guise of Reasons.Alex Gregory - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):63-72.
Intelligibilität und Normativität.Norbert Anwander - 2002 - Analyse & Kritik 24 (2):231-248.
Autonomy and Depression.Lubomira Radoilska - 2013 - In K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davis, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini & Tim Thornton (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press. pp. 1155-1170.
The Guise of the Objectively Good.Samuel Kahn - 2013 - Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (1-2):87-99.
Review: Discussion: "The Guise of a Reason". [REVIEW]Nadeem J. Z. Hussain - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263 - 275.


Added to PP

171 (#72,818)

6 months
6 (#124,048)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Francesco Orsi
University of Tartu

Citations of this work

Intelligibility and the Guise of the Good.Paul Boswell - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):1-31.
Hegel on Addiction.Katerina Deligiorgi - 2019 - Hegel Bulletin 40 (3):398-424.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons and the Guise of the Good.Kael McCormack - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Practical Philosophy.Immanuel Kant - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 36 references / Add more references